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The Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) framework is a prominent macro model that features credit 
constraints as an important factor that propagates and magnifies the effects of shocks. 
However, the quantitative importance of these constraints in this setup remains an open 
question. This paper introduces the Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) setup into an otherwise 
standard dynamic general equilibrium model to explore the quantitative properties of 
credit constraints. I take a Hansen (1985)- type RBC model and introduce a banking 
sector that intermediates savings and investment. After calibrating the model to post-
1959 U.S. data, I evaluate the propagation and magnification effects of a standard TFP 
shock to the aggregate economy. I find that the quantitative importance is very small. I 
then ask if the propagation and magnification effects are stronger if the shock originates 
in the banking sector. I therefore introduce TFP shocks into financial intermediation. I 
find that the constraints are also quantitatively unimportant. I conclude that the 
quantitative significance of the credit constraint in the Kiyotaki-Moore setup is small. 
The reason underlying this result has to do, theoretically, with asset market dynamics 
and, empirically, with the low participation of loans in economic activity in the U.S. 
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CEDE 1 INTRODUCTION
A huge volume of theoretical literature suggests that frictions/constraints in ¯nancial
markets play a critical role in propagating and amplifying macroeconomic shocks.1 The
basic story is that the ¯rm's ability to ¯nance its production plan is an increasing func-
tion of the value of its assets. When the value of these assets increases (either because
the price of assets increases or because the ¯rm reinvests more pro¯ts), the ¯rm is able
to expand its production plan (either because credit constraints become less stringent
or because some external ¯nance premium falls). A higher level of production and in-
vestment increases asset demand (and asset prices) and/or earnings (and reinvestment
of pro¯ts) thus increasing even further the value of the ¯rm's assets and its ability to
expand its production plan, and so on. A credit multiplier or ¯nancial accelerator is
articulated as the basic source of propagation and ampli¯cation of shocks.
The Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) -KM hereafter- framework is a prominent macro model
among this type of literature. It features credit constraints as the essential factor
that propagates and magni¯es the e®ects of macro shocks. Indeed, their propaga-
tion/ampli¯cation mechanism consists of static and dynamic credit multipliers engi-
neered around a credit constraint that is an increasing function of asset prices. Hence,
action in the asset market fuels the ampli¯cation/propagation e®ects of their macro
dynamics. However, the quantitative signi¯cance of the macroeconomic e®ects coming
from the credit constraint in the KM setup remains an open question.
This paper introduces and simpli¯es the KM framework into an otherwise standard
dynamic general equilibrium model to explore the quantitative properties of credit
constraints. I take a Hansen (1985)-type RBC model and introduce a banking sector
1Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Bernanke and Gertler (1989,1990), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki(1998), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Cooley and
Quadrini (1999, 2000), Schneider and Tornell (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000), Kocher-
lakota (2000), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000a, 2000b), Mendoza (2001).
2that intermediates savings and investment. Credit operates as an intermediate input
to ¯nal good production.2 The KM credit multipliers are activated by constraining the
outstanding value of the ¯rm's bank debt with the value of the ¯rm owner's collateral.
Asset prices, quantities and the loan rate will determine the volume of collateral.
After calibrating the model to post-1959 U.S. data, I evaluate the propagation and
magni¯cation e®ects of a standard TFP shock to the aggregate (non-banking) econ-
omy. I ¯nd that the quantitative importance of the propagation/amplication e®ects
of the credit constraint is very small. I then ask if these e®ects are stronger when the
shock originates in the banking sector. I therefore introduce TFP shocks into ¯nancial
intermediation. I also ¯nd that the propagation/ampli¯cation e®ects of the credit con-
straint are quantitatively unimportant. I conclude that the quantitative importance of
the credit constraint in the KM setup is small.
The results of this paper support the ¯ndings of Kocherlakota (2000). He showed
that even though he could engineer arbitrarily high degrees of ampli¯cation using credit
constraints (in a KM setup), the parameter values required to articulate such ampli-
¯cation degrees did not seem plausible.3 Since I use plausibly calibrated parameter
values (those that replicate long-run empirical regularities in U.S. post-Korean war
macro data), the quantitative signi¯cance of the action coming from the KM credit
constraint could not be very high.
The reason that explains why credit constraints in the KM framework are not de-
livering any action has to do with the asset market. Any typical investment demand
2This captures the idea that ¯rms usually need to pay for some intermediate inputs (or labor
services) in advance of production and must rely on liquid funds provided by banks to do so. Without
these liquid external funds, ¯rms cannot operate their technologies and, in this sense, bank loans can
be understood as a di®erent input of production.
3e.g.: discount factor very close to one, collateralizable inputs' share (e.g. land share) close to one
and non-collateralizable inputs' share close to zero. When he introduces labor and sets parameter
values that are closer to observed input shares, the ampli¯cation degree is very small.
3function is downward sloping in asset prices. However, the shape of investment supply
as a function of asset prices is conditioned to whether the credit contraint binds or
not. If the credit constraint binds, investment supply is upward sloping in asset prices.
Otherwise, as in a standard RBC model, investment supply is a horizontal line at a
¯xed asset price. Consider a positive productivity shock that shifts investment demand
outwardly. Even though asset prices increase more in the credit constrained environ-
ment, the quantity invested rises more in the unconstrained environment. Thus, the
overall (i.e. price£quantity) e®ect over investment value could be very similar under
both environments. If so, the quantitative signi¯cance of the constraint will be very
low. As I show in this paper, with a plausible calibration of the KM setup this is the
result that is observed.
Recent work has confronted other ¯nancial friction stories with macro data. The
results also question the quantitative signi¯cance of macro dynamics stemming from
¯nancial frictions. For instance, using the standard business cycle model as theoretical
framework, Cole and Ohanian (2000) ¯nd that the traditional Bernanke (1983) ¯nancial
disintermediation/bank failure story can only explain a very small portion of the Great
Depression (at most, a 1% output reduction between 1929 and 1933).4 Moreover, they
¯nd that some of the model's predictions following a banking shock are at variance with
the data. Chakraborty and Lahiri (2001) modify the standard, one-sector neoclassical
growth model to incorporate ¯nancial frictions using agency costs. They calibrate
the model to cross-country, 1990-1997 data for 79 countries and report that ¯nancial
frictions can typically explain less than 5% of the income gap between the ¯ve richest
and ¯ve poorest countries in the world.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section
4This small number comes from two sources: i) the banking shock in terms of the model (share
of deposits in failed/suspended banks) is small (19% between 1930 and 1933), and ii) the elasticity
of aggregate output with respect to a banking shock in terms of the model (banking's share of value
added) is very small also (1%).
43 discusses the calibration strategy. Sections 4 presents the results of the paper. The
last section concludes.
2 MODEL
In each period the economy is inhabited by a large number (N) of identical, in¯nitely-
lived, risk-averse households that discount the future at rate 1=¯ ¡ 1. Population
grows at rate ´ and the initial population level is normalized to 1 [Nt = (1 + ´)t].
Each household is endowed with one unit of time which can be allocated to leisure
or to labor. Labor is indivisible like in Hansen (1985). The shift length is ¯xed at
h < 1 units of time and the household sends a fraction n of its members to work while
the remaining fraction (1 ¡ n) does not work at all. Households have log utility in
consumption (c) and leisure:
U = log(c) + nlog(1 ¡ h)
Households supply their labor services to a competitive market at wage w. Each
household also owns capital (k) and land (l), which it can rent out in competitive
markets at rental rates r and s, respectively. The ¯nal good of this economy, which
is the numeraire, can be consumed (c) or accumulated as additional capital (k) by
each household. Land, on the other hand, is a di®erent good and its total supply is
equal to the population level. Hence, land supply is ¯xed at 1 at the per capita level.
To purchase an additional unit of land a household must pay q. The stock of capital
depreciates at rate ± and the stock of land does not depreciate.
Besides households, two other actors play a role in this economy: a ¯rm and a
bank. The ¯rm produces ¯nal output using labor, capital, land and the bank's output
as inputs to a constant returns to scale (crs) technology. Note then that the bank's
output is simply an intermediate input to the ¯nal good producing ¯rm. To produce
5Table 1:
Market Demand Supply Price
1.Final good households ¯rm 1
2.Land households households q
3.Labor services ¯rm and bank households w
4.Capital services ¯rm households r
5.Land services ¯rm households s
6.Credit ¯rm bank (1 + ½)
this intermediate input the bank combines deposits and labor in another crs production
function. Let the relative price of the bank's output be denoted as (1+½). Given that
the bank's output has the interpretation of an intra-temporal loan, (1 + ½) has the
interpretation of an intra-temporal, gross, loan rate. Deposits come from abroad at
exogenous, intra-temporal, gross rate (1 + R). Note that the bank plays no role in
transferring purchasing power across periods. Households can do this internally by
accumulating capital or by purchasing land.
At the end of the day the three actors of the economy revolve around six markets5:
Finally, it is assumed that the ¯nal good producing ¯rm and the bank are subject to
stochastic, AR(1), productivity shocks z and x, respectively, and that they also exhibit
deterministic, labor augmenting, technological progress at rates u and v, respectively.
This distinguishes continuous, permanent, technological improvement (e.g. discovery
of a new technology) from random, temporary, productivity shocks (e.g. regulatory
changes). This also allows the model to exhibit a constant loan-deposit interest rate
5Actually there is a seventh market which is the market for deposits (banks demand and foreign
investors supply). However its relative price (1+R) is exogenously determined by demand and supply
conditions in foreign credit markets.
6spread while the bank enjoys continuous productivity improvement.
The economy exhibits a balanced growth path along which the per-capita capital
stock, per-capita consumption, per-capita ¯nal good output, per-capita deposits, the
wage and the rental rate of land grow at a constant rate while per-capita landholdings,
the employment rate and the rental rate of capital remain constant. The balanced
growth path of the economy will be studied here.
2.1 Household
Let e ¯ = ¯(1 + ´). The following sequential problem for one household can be mapped
into a social planning problem for the aggregate economy if the utility of each household
is weighted equally by the planner:
Maxfct; kt+1; lt+1; ntg E0
P1
t=0 e ¯t [log(ct) + nt log(1 ¡ h)]
s:t:
ct + (1 + ´)kt+1 + qtlt+1 = wtnth + [rt + (1 ¡ ±)]kt + (st + qt)lt
qt; wt; rt; st; given
k0; l0 = 1 given
where c, k, l, and n represent the household's stock of capital, consumption level,
stock of land and employment rate, respectively.
2.2 Final Good Producing Firm
In this economy the ¯nal good producing ¯rm uses a Cobb-Douglas technology in four
inputs of production: labor, capital, land and credit. Let kd, n1, bd and ld represent the
per-capita volume of capital services, employees, credit and land services demanded by



















log(zt+1) = ½0 + ½1 log(zt) + "t+1; "t » N(0;¾
2
")
The loans-in-the production function assumption articulates the credit channel of
the economy. The motivation for this loan-in-the-production function assumption is
that ¯rms usually need to pay for some intermediate inputs (or labor services) in
advance of production and must rely on liquid funds provided by banks to do so.
Without these liquid external funds, ¯rms cannot operate their technologies. In this
sense, loans can be understood as a di®erent input of production.
In fact, a model with a loans-in-the production function assumption is isomorphic
to a model with a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on the intermediate input bill or
wage bill of the ¯nal good producing ¯rm. Consider, for instance, a variation of the CIA
model suggested by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995). The ¯nal good producing ¯rm needs
capital, labor, land and intermediate inputs to operate its Cobb-Douglas technology.
Let md represent the per-capita volume of intermediate inputs demanded by the ¯rm.


















where Z is a productivity shock. Suppose that intermediate inputs are provided
by foreign agents at exogenous price p. However, the ¯rm must pay the suppliers of
intermediate inputs in advance of production. This means that the ¯nal good producing
¯rm is subject to a CIA constraint on the intermediate input bill (pmd). The central
assumption is that the current intermediate input bill is ¯nanced with a bank loan.
These loans are repaid (without default) at the end of the period and the bank charges
interest rate ½ for them. Hence, the ¯nal good producing ¯rm solves the following
problem in each period:
8Maxfkd
t ; n1t; md
t; ld
t; bd
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Rearranging implies that the ¯rm solves:
Maxfkd





















t ¡ wtn1t ¡ stl
d








(i.e. the exogenously determined price of intermediate inputs becomes
part of the ¯rm's overall productivity). Hence, the model with a CIA constraint on
the ¯rm's intermediate input bill is isomorphic to a model with loans-in-the production
function. At the end of the day both treatments highlight the role of liquidity or work-
ing capital provided by ¯nancial intermediaries as essential to production processes.
Due to its simplicity, the loans-in-the production function assumption is used hereafter
to articulate a credit channel in the economy.
2.3 Bank
In order to study the macroeconomic impact of productivity °uctuations in ¯nancial
intermediation, the model must employ an appropriate representation of the banking
technology through which resources are intermediated. Indeed, the model suggested
here employs a technological speci¯cation for banks that follows the \intermediation
approach" of Sealey and Lindley (1977). Under this approach all deposits and funds
borrowed from ¯nancial markets are considered inputs of production [Freixas and Ro-
9chet (1998)].6 Alternative approaches are the \production approach" and the \user
cost approach" which treat depositor services as part of a ¯nancial intermediary's ¯nal
output [e.g.: Tirtiroglu, Daniels and Tirtiroglu (1998)].7
Consider a setup where banks combine deposits and labor in a Cobb Douglas tech-
nology to produce the intra-period safe loans that the ¯nal good producing ¯rm requires
each period.8 Let dt and n2 represent the per-capita volume of deposits and employ-








6The idea behind this approach is that all liabilities in the bank's balance sheet (core deposits and
purchased funds) plus ¯nancial equity capital provide funds and are considered to be inputs since
they generate costs [Berger and Mester (2001)]. On the other hand, all assets (loans and investments
outstanding) use bank funds to generate revenues and are considered outputs [Freixas and Rochet
(1998)]. Note that following this approach implies interpreting depositor services as payments to
¯nancial inputs that do not receive interest remuneration (like demand deposits) [see Berger and
Mester (2001) pp. 16].
7According to Berger and Mester (2001), pp. 16: \...the asset approach -which treats deposits
as an input- is most compatible with the pro¯t maximization concepts ... because deposits and other
liabilities by themselves generate negative cash °ows and reduce pro¯ts, whereas loans and other assets
generate positive cash °ows and pro¯ts. As a practical matter, it would also be di±cult to specify a
positive output price for depositor services under the other approaches, since most of these services
are not explicitly priced."
8Actually, any crs technology in the banking sector can be used. In fact, alternative functional
forms for the bank's production function like Leontief or Leontief with adjustment costs in employment
were also studied (adjustment costs capture the idea that banks pay certain cost when they change
their employees due to speci¯c information or knowledge that the employees have about the bank's
clients). Here the Cobb-Douglas case is presented due to its analytical tractability.
10log(xt+1) = '0 + '1 log(xt) + Àt+1; Àt » N(0;¾
2
À)
Note that the intermediation technology is costly. In fact, wn2h ¸ 0 captures all
the resources used in the intermediation process. This formalizes the idea that in order
to intermediate deposits into loans, banks must carry out a variety of costly activities
like evaluating creditors, managing deposits, renting buildings, maintaining ATMs, etc.
[Edwards and Vegh (1997)].9
The technological speci¯cation suggested here for banks is similar to the one used
by Cole and Ohanian (2000). In their paper the intermediation technology is G(D;Z)
where D is uninstalled physical capital, Z is intermediation capital (in ¯xed supply),
G(¢) exhibits crs and D¡G(D;Z) ¸ 0 represents resources used in the intermediation
process. Under the technology speci¯ed here deposits (d) are the natural counterpart
to their uninstalled physical capital (D) and productivity parameter x in combination
with labor (n2h) play an analogous role to that of their intermediation capital (Z).
With crs in the intermediation technology it is possible to assume an atomistic
structure in the banking industry. This assumption is also consistent with the fact
that ¯rms of many sizes coexist in the ¯nancial sector. Under this environment banks
behave competitively and are price takers. Formally, in every period banks solve the
following problem:




1¡µ ¡ (1 + R)dt ¡ wtn2t
Free entry and exit will drive pro¯ts to zero so that in equilibrium banks produce
where the relative price of their output (1 + ½t) equals marginal cost.
9For instance, in the year 2000, 63.27% of all U.S. commercial banking employees had o±ce and
administrative support occupations [e.g. tellers (23.04%)]. Only 14.86% of all employees carried out
business and ¯nancial operations occupations [e.g. loan o±cers (4.86%), ¯nancial analysts (1.05%),
credit analysts (0.91%), personal ¯nancial advisors (0.93%)]. Source: BLS.
112.4 Credit Constraint
To introduce a credit constraint into the model an environment similar to the one
suggested by Kocherlakota (2000) will be assumed. Suppose the bank is owned by the
international depositors. Funding the ¯rm's working capital is risky for the bank. The
reason is that at the end of every period the owner of the ¯rm -the household- can
run away with the proceeds from the ¯rm plus a fraction » 2 [0;1] of his/her total
assets (i.e. land plus the undepreciated stock of capital), without paying back the loan
to the bank. Assume also that default is not penalized with market exclusion. The
bank is aware of the risk involved in lending to the ¯rm. As a result, the bank takes
care not to let the ¯rm borrow beyond the amount that would make it worthwhile for
the owner to run away without repaying the loan. The next proposition reveals the
incentive-compatibility condition imposed by the bank so that it is optimal for the ¯rm
never to default in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1. Under the following credit constraint:
b
d ·
(1 ¡ »)[qld + (1 ¡ ±)kd]
(1 + ½)
it is optimal for the ¯rm to repay the loan.
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
The previous proposition shows that, in order to eliminate the risk of default, the
bank imposes a natural credit constraint on the ¯rm: the outstanding value of the
¯rm's debt at the end of the period [(1+½)bd] can never exceed the value of the owner's
seizable/collateralizable resources at the end of the period
¡
(1 ¡ »)[qld + (1 ¡ ±)kd]
¢
.
As in other credit limit models, borrowing is so tightly constrained by the volume of
collateral that default never occurs in equilibrium. Note also that the credit constraint
is a decreasing function of the gross loan rate. This captures the idea that any rise in
12the interest rate melts down collateral by reducing the volume of principal associated
to any given volume of outstanding debt at the end of the period.
It is important to highlight that the credit constraint on the ¯rm does not feed back
into the bank's problem. As in the absence of the constraint, the bank is simply trying
to use labor and deposits optimally to provide that volume of credit that the ¯rm plans
(and is allowed) to use. In fact, if the credit constraint was to be imposed not only
on the ¯rm but also on the bank (as a limit or upper bound on its volume of output),
the bank's pro¯ts would be given by ¹(1 + ½)b where ¹ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier
associated to the constraint. Note that if the credit constraint binds (¹ > 0), it would
seem as if the bank was obtaining positive pro¯ts. However, there cannot be positive
pro¯ts in equilibrium. 10 Thus, the bank's problem remains intact.
2.5 Balanced Growth Path
Along the balanced growth path of the economy the per-capita stock of capital, per-
capita consumption, per-capita ¯nal good output, per-capita deposits, the wage and
the rental rate of land grow at the same rate. Let g be this rate. On the other hand,
employment allocated to each sector (i.e. bank and ¯rm), the per-capita stock of land







10Suppose a bank is operating in the economy giving the ¯rm a volume of credit and a loan rate
as dictated by the constraint. If the bank obtains a positive pro¯t from this, another bank would
immediately come in and o®er the ¯rm a bigger volume of credit at a lesser loan rate [-recall that the
credit constraint is on (1 + ½)b-]. This implies the same amount of revenue for the bank but higher
input costs (recall that the bank takes the wage and the deposit rate as given). Thus, the entering
¯rm would basically drive down the industry's pro¯ts. But then some other bank would come in and
follow the same strategy. Consequently, in equilibrium, pro¯ts go to zero. This also means that ¹ = 0
both when the credit constraint binds and when it is slack.
13To simplify notation, from now on all variables (which are already in per-capita
terms) are also in growth-detrended terms.
2.6 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The aggregate state of the economy is given by the two stochastic shocks and the
aggregate stock of capital: (z;x;K). At an individual level, the state is given by the
individual capital stock and individual landholdings (k;l). The following de¯nitions
formalize the recursive competitive equilibrium of the per-capita economy along its
balanced growth path, in terms of growth-detrended variables.
De¯nition 2.2. P1 is the following dynamic programming problem for the household:
V (z;x;K;k;l) = Maxk0;l0;nflog[w(z;x;K)nh + [r(z;x;K) + (1 ¡ ±)]k+
[s(z;x;K) + q(z;x;K)]l ¡ (1 + ´)(1 + g)k0
¡q(z;x;K)l0] + nlog(1 ¡ h) + e ¯EV (z0;x0;K0;k0;l0)g
s:t:
K0 = H(z;x;K)
log(z0) = ½0 + ½1 log(z) + "0; "0 » N(0;¾2
")
log(x0) = '0 + '1 log(x) + À0; À0 » N(0;¾2
À)
cov(";À) = 0
De¯nition 2.3. If there are no credit constraints, P2 is the following static problem
for the ¯nal good producing ¯rm:








If there is a credit constraint, P2 is the following static problem for the ¯nal good
producing ¯rm:











De¯nition 2.4. P3 is the following static problem for the bank:
Maxfn2;dg [1 + ½(z;x;K)]b ¡ (1 + R)d ¡ w(z;x;K)n2h
s:t:
b = xdµ(n2h)1¡µ
De¯nition 2.5. A recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE) is
1. A value function: V (z;x;K;k;l).
2. A set of individual decision rules: k0(z;x;K;k;l); l0(z;x;K;k;l) and n(z; x; K;
k; l).
3. A set of demands by the ¯nal good producing ¯rm: kd(z;x;K); n1(z;x;K);
bd(z;x;K) and ld(z;x;K).
4. A set of demands by the bank: d(z;x;K) and n2(z;x;K)
5. A set of pricing functions: w(z;x;K);r(z;x;K);s(z;x;K);q(z;x;K) and ½(z;x;K).
6. An aggregate decision rule: H(z;x;K).
such that:
² Given (5) and (6), (1) and (2) solve (P1).
² Given (5), (3) solves (P2).
² Given (5), (4) solves (P3).
15² Markets clear:
1. n1(z;x;K) + n2(z;x;K) = n(z;x;K;K;1)
2. kd(z;x;K) = K
3. ld(z;x;K) = 1
4. l0(z;x;K;K;1) = 1
5. bd(z;x;K) = b(z;x;K) = xd(z;x;K)µ [n2(z;x;K)h]
1¡µ
² Aggregate Consistency: k0(z;x;K;K;1) = H(z;x;K).
2.7 Unconstrained Economy
Suppose there is no credit constraint. The clearing of the ¯ve markets in the RCE
de¯nition implies, by Walras' Law, that the ¯nal good market also clears:
















Equation (1) is simply the resource constraint for the economy.






















wh + log(1 ¡ h) = 0 (4)
Equations (2) and (3) are the standard Euler equations governing the optimal con-
sumption/capital accumulation and consumption/land accumulation decisions of the
household. Equation (4) simply equates the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption [i.e. ¡log(1¡h)c] to the marginal opportunity cost of leisure
in terms of consumption [i.e. wh].
Optimality conditions for the bank are:
µ(1 + ½)b = d(1 + R) (5)
(1 ¡ µ)(1 + ½)b = wn2h (6)
(5) shows that it is optimal for the bank to demand deposits so that the marginal






. Equation (6) shows the same thing for employment demand
by the bank. Both equations imply zero pro¯t for the bank, which is a natural result
of its crs technology.
Optimality conditions for the ¯rm are:
Áy = (1 + ½)b
d (7)
°y = wn1h (8)
®y = rk
d (9)
(1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)y = sl
d (10)
17(7)-(10) indicate that it is optimal for the ¯rm to produce in that point where the
marginal productivity and cost of each input are equated. They also imply zero pro¯ts
for the ¯rm, as expected from its crs technology. (6) and (8) show that, in equilibrium,
the marginal productivity of labor is equated across both sectors of the economy.
The next proposition establishes the price of land in equilibrium:











¢t = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)yt
Proof. See technical appendix.
The previous proposition shows that the price of land is given by the expected
present discounted value of its forever °ow of future rental payments. Rental payments
to land are given by its marginal productivity and, as is standard in this type of models,
the asset pricing kernel is the stochastic discount factor.
2.8 Credit Constrained Economy
Suppose now that there is a credit constraint. Given that (P1) and (P3) do not
change, equations (1)-(6) remain intact. Let ¸ ¸ 0 denote the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier
associated to the credit constraint in the ¯rm's static problem (P2). This multiplier
determines the shadow price of collateral. Optimality conditions for the ¯nal good
producing ¯rm are given by:
¸ =
Áy
bd ¡ (1 + ½) ¸ 0 (7cc)






bd ¡ (1 + ½)
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Equation (7cc) indicates that the shadow price of collateral is given by the gap
between the marginal product and the marginal cost of one unit of credit. Note that
in the non-constrained environment optimality for the ¯rm dictates that the marginal
productivity of credit must always be equated to the gross loan rate or marginal cost
of credit [see equation (7)]. However, with a credit constraint the optimal level of
loans may exceed the credit limit. In fact, if the credit constraint binds (i.e. ¸ > 0),
equation (7cc) shows that the marginal product of credit will exceed the gross loan
rate (or marginal cost of credit) and the shadow price of collateral will be positive
given that collateral plays the role of a scarce resource. Moreover, an output loss or
ine±ciency will be observed in the economy. Contrarily, if the credit constraint does
not bind (i.e. ¸ = 0), equation (7cc) becomes equation (7), the marginal product and
cost of credit will be equated and the shadow price of collateral will be zero given that
there is no need or demand for collateral. No output loss whatsoever will be observed
in the economy.
Note that equation (8cc) is identical to equation (8). This indicates that, regardless
of whether the credit constraint binds or not, it is optimal for the ¯rm to demand labor
so its marginal product and cost are equated. Moreover, (6) and (8cc) show that, as
in the unconstrained setup, the equilibrium wage is given by the marginal product of
labor in either sector of the economy. In other words, marginal productivities of labor
are always equated across both sectors of the economy. This is independent of whether
there is a binding or non-binding credit constraint or no credit constraint at all.





This means that the marginal contribution of employment to ¯nal good output does
19not depend on whether the employment is allocated to the ¯nal good sector itself or to
its intermediate input (i.e. the bank). However, when there is a credit constraint it can




n2 . Thus, if the credit constraint binds,
the marginal contribution to ¯nal good output of employment in the bank exceeds that
of employment in the ¯nal good sector itself.
Equation (9cc) shows that the rental rate of capital has two components. The
¯rst one, which is the marginal product of capital, is standard and simply captures
the direct contribution of capital to output as an input of production. The second
component, which is the second term on the right-hand side of (9cc), captures the
indirect contribution of capital to output due to the role that capital plays as collateral.
Indeed, one additional unit of capital releases (1¡»)(1¡±)=(1+½) additional units of
credit. Each of these additional units of available credit generate [
¡
Áy=bd¢
¡ (1 + ½)]
additional units of net output gain. Note, however, that the second component of




> (1 + ½)]. In fact, if the credit constraint does not bind [i.e. if
¸ = 0 ()
¡
Áy=bd¢
= (1 + ½)], then (9cc) becomes (9).
Equation (10cc) shows that in a credit constrained environment the rental rate of
land also has two components. The ¯rst one, which is the marginal product of land,
simply represents the direct contribution of land to output as an input of production.
The second component, given by the second term on the right-hand side of (10cc),
captures the indirect contribution of land to output due to the role that land plays as
collateral. In fact, one additional unit of land releases (1¡»)q=(1+½) additional units




additional units of net output gain. Again, note that the second component of the rental








then (10cc) becomes (10).
20(9cc) and (10cc) basically show that, as long as the credit constraint binds, the
collateral properties of land and capital enhance their marginal contribution to output.
This result is important in itself because it alters the de¯nition of the equilibrium rental
rates of land and capital with respect to the unconstrained environment. This result is
also important because the rental rate of capital and the price of land -which depends
on the rental rate of land- play a central role in the articulation of the dynamic credit
multiplier.
Using (7cc)-(10cc) the following result holds:
(1 + ½)b
d = Áy ¡ ¸b
d · Áy (11)
rk
d + sl
d = ®y + (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)y + ¸b
d if ¸ > 0
= ®y + (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)y if ¸ = 0
w(n1h) = °y
(11) shows that whenever the credit constraint binds (i.e. ¸ > 0), the share of
credit in output falls short of its natural share Á. As a result, the shares of capital and
land in output exceed their natural shares ® and (1¡®¡° ¡Á). However, labor share
in the ¯nal good producing ¯rm is still ° and the zero pro¯t condition still holds. If
the credit constraint does not bind (i.e. ¸ = 0), the fraction of output paid to every
input coincides with its natural share. These results play a key role for the calibration
of the parameters of this economy when the credit constraint binds.
The next proposition establishes the price of land in equilibrium:















¢t = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)yt
and:




Proof. See technical appendix.
Proposition 7 shows that the price of land is given by the expected present dis-
counted value of its forever °ow of future rental payments. Discounting is done with
the stochastic discount factor. Note also that future rental payments to land are an
increasing function of the future marginal productivity of land and credit. Again, this
captures the idea that future rental payments to land include not only the future direct
contribution of land to output as an input of production [(1¡®¡° ¡Á)yt+1], but also
the future cumulated indirect contribution of land to output as a collateralizable asset






. This is a nice result because it shows that
credit constrained agents value assets not only because of their future direct contribu-
tion to output, but also because assets operate as collateral. Simply put, accumulating
an additional unit of land is valuable not only because it increases future production
directly, but also because it rises the future volume of collateral, loosens the future
credit constraint and increases the future availability of external funds, thus expanding
future output indirectly.11
11This feature of the asset is not present in the Kocherlakota (2000) model. In his setup loans
are repaid in the next period and enter linearly into the production function. Thus, the marginal
productivity of credit is 1 while the present value marginal cost of credit is (1 + ½)=(1 + ½) = 1.





term disappears from the asset pricing equation.
222.9 Credit Multipliers
The credit constrained economy displays a static and a dynamic credit multiplier [see
KM (1997)]. The mechanics are very simple. Suppose that the credit constraint binds
and consider an adverse TFP shock to the bank. This induces a contemporaneous
hike in the loan rate charged by the bank in equilibrium. The jump in the loan rate
immediately melts down the volume of collateral and tightens the credit limit of the
¯rm. Therefore, the ¯rm su®ers a crunch in the volume of available external funds or
working capital. Naturally, the ¯rm's ability to ¯nance its production plan is reduced
with this credit crunch. As the ¯rm's output falls, its demand for labor services,
capital services and land services goes down. Thus, there is a reduction in the wage,
the rental rate of capital and the rental rate of land. This immediately drives down the
income of the household. In an attempt to smooth out consumption, the household
instantaneously reduces its accumulation of capital and land.
Given that land is in ¯xed supply, the fall in demand for this asset reduces its price.
The fall in the price of land drives down the current value of the ¯rm's collateralizable
assets and, hence, tightens even further the credit constraint faced by the ¯rm. The
volume of available external funds or working capital is further reduced and, hence,
the fall in income is magni¯ed. This is the static multiplier.
Now, recall that the price of land is given by the present discounted value of its
forever °ow of future rental payments. As seen above, these rental payments are an
increasing function of the marginal productivity of land and credit. Since the capital
stock is complementary to both land and credit, the reduction in capital accumulation
during the period of the shock implies a fall in the future marginal productivity of land
and credit. Consequently, there is a fall in the future °ow of rental payments to land.
This drives down the price of land in the period of the shock. This reduces even more
the value of land on impact and, hence, tightens even further the credit constraint
in the period of the shock. The credit crunch is enhanced and the fall in income is
23magni¯ed. This is the dynamic multiplier.
While the multipliers amplify the shock, a di®erent process propagates it. The
reduction in capital accumulation reduces, by de¯nition, the volume of collateral avail-
able for next period. Thus, the borrowing constraint of next period is also tightened
even if the shock has vanished and the lending rate has returned to its normal level.
Furthermore, recall that the rental rates of land and capital are a function not only of
the marginal productivity of land and capital, but also of the marginal productivity
of credit. Thus, the reduction in land and capital accumulation in the period of the
shock pushes down the following period's rental rates of land and capital (by reducing
the following period's marginal productivity of credit). This prevents land and capital
accumulation and land's price from picking up faster in the period after the shock.
Thus, not only does the household have less collateral in the period after the shock
(even if the shock has vanished completely), but it also has fewer incentives to start
accumulating land and capital once again. All this propagates the credit crunch into
the subsequent periods. The economy takes longer to converge back to the steady state
than in a ¯nancially frictionless setup.
3 CALIBRATION
Parameters were calibrated to a quarterly frequency using U.S. data for the period
1959-1999 (see calibration appendix). Speci¯cally, parameter values were chosen so
that the model (with and without a binding credit constraint), in stationary state,
replicates the following 1959-1999 averages observed in the U.S.:
It is important to highlight that, for calibration purposes, credit was measured as
commercial and industrial loans from commercial banks. Recall that in the theoretical
model credit is interpreted as intra-period working capital or liquidity that ¯rms need
in order to pay wages or other intermediate inputs and, thereby, operate their technolo-
24Table 2:
c=y i=y d=y k=y n n1 n2
0:5914 0:3422 0:0661 10:1740 0:9399 0:9299 0:01
Table 3:
labor share land share capital share deposit share
0:5394 0:0130 0:3811 0:0664
gies. Credit in the model is not used as an explicit source of ¯nance for consumption or
investment. If it is plausible to assume that ¯rms rely mainly on commercial banks for
working capital credit lines, commercial and industrial loans from commercial banks
seem the proper empirical counterpart of credit in the model. Hence, for calibration
purposes, other credit sources (e.g.. credit from investment banks, bond issuing, credit
from S&L or thrift institutions, etc.) and other credit uses (e.g.. consumption loans,
real estate loans, loans to the government, etc.) do not belong in the empirical coun-
terpart of the model's credit de¯nition.12
Table (4) illustrate the calibrated parameter values if the credit constraint is left
out (see calibration appendix):
Table (5) illustrate the calibrated parameter values when the credit constraint is
introduced and binds (see calibration appendix). These are the parameter values of
the model if it were true that the productive apparatus of the U.S. economy has faced
12Commercial and industrial loans from commercial banks over-estimate credit (as de¯ned in the
model) because some of these commercial and industrial loans are used to ¯nance investment projects
and not only working capital. However, by excluding the other sources of ¯nance available to a
¯rm, the measure of credit is also being underestimated because some of the other types of ¯nancial
institutions also issue temporary lines of credit that ¯rms may use for working capital.
25Table 4:
¯ ± ® ° Á µ h g ´ R
0:994 0:025 0:381 0:534 0:072 0:920 0:621 0:00546 0:00268 0:00459
Table 5:
¯ ± ® ° Á µ h » g ´ R
0:994 0:025 0:375 0:534 0:08 0:920 0:621 0:9946 0:00546 0:00268 0:00459
credit constraints during the 1959-1999 period:
Except for ® and Á, all parameters keep the same value under both setups. This
is a natural result. Recall that, with a binding credit constraint, the share of credit
in output has to lie below its natural share Á. On the other hand, under a credit
constrained environment, the shares of capital and land in output must exceed their
natural shares ® and (1¡®¡° ¡Á). In consequence, with a binding credit constraint,
the calibrated values for ® = 0:375 and (1¡®¡° ¡Á) = 0:0110 must fall short of the
capital and land shares measured in the data and replicated by the model (0:3811 and
0:0130). Additionally, the calibrated values for Áµ = 0:0736 and ° +Á(1¡µ) = 0:5401
must lie above the deposit and labor shares measured in the data and replicated by the
model (0:0664 and 0:5394). Given that the calibrated values for µ and ° do not change
with respect to the ¯nancially frictionless economy, the previous condition implies that,
in the credit constrained economy, the calibrated value for Á must exceed the value
calibrated for the unconstrained economy.
If the model with the binding credit constraint is taken literally, the calibrated
value for » implies that only 0.54% of household's/¯rm's assets in the U.S. economy
are collateralizable for bank loans (i.e. seizable by banks). This seems a very low
26number. Yet, a di®erent value for » does not allow the model to replicate the 1959-
1999 U.S. empirical regularities under a binding credit constraint. Hence, this result
for » might shed some doubt on the empirical validity of an overall credit constraint
on the productive apparatus of the U.S. economy during the 1959-1999 period.
The calibration seems reasonable except for two features. First, the model's share of
commercial banks in output is high (7.2%) considering that the gross product attributed
to commercial banking activities as a percentage of total GDP has °uctuated between
1.1% and 2.7% between 1947 and 1987.13 However, the model replicates with exactitude
the share of deposits in income (6:64%). The second uncomfortable result of the
calibration is that the fraction of time that agents spend in market activities (nh =
0:58) is high considering that this number has been estimated to be around 0.31. An
alternative would be to calibrate the model so that it replicates this number. The
problem with this calibration procedure is that it would not replicate exactly labor's
share or land's share of output.
The steady state of the model implies that ql=y = 3:4430 and b=y = 0:0519. These
ratios were not targeted with the calibration strategy. According to land market value
data from the discontinued C.9 release of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the
average land to output ratio was 0:3531 during the period 1959 ¡ 1994. According
to data on commercial and industrial loans from commercial banks the average loans
to output ratio is 0:0801 for the period 1959 ¡ 1999. Note then that the model does
not replicate the land to output ratio and the loans to output ratio observed in the
data. The mismatch is especially severe in the land to output ratio. However, land
market value data is not very reliable; in fact, it is discontinued. Moreover, this data
is not needed for the calibration strategy. Now, the data-model mismatch of the loans
13Source: Dept. of Commerce, BEA. Data for the period 1987-2001 is only available for the ag-
gregate of all depository institutions. Between 1987 and 2001 the gross product of all depository
institutions as a percentage of total GDP has °uctuated between 2.8% and 3.7%.
27to output ratio is not too serious considering that the model still replicates accurately
the observed deposit to output ratio. Recall that deposits are, ultimately, the relevant
intermediate ¯nancial input into ¯nal good production.14
Now, recall the parameters of the stochastic processes governing log(z) and log(x):
log(zt+1) = ½0 + ½1 log(zt) + "t+1; "t v N(0;¾
2
")
log(xt+1) = '0 + '1 log(xt) + Àt+1; Àt v N(0;¾
2
À)
The way in which z and x can be constructed from data is detailed in the shock
identi¯cation appendix. U.S. quarterly data was used to construct series for z and x.
The parameters of the AR(1) processes governing log(z) and log(x) were estimated with
simple ordinary least squares techniques. The resulting estimates depend on whether
data for deposits is used or not (see shock identi¯cation appendix). The following
table reports the results of the estimation using the complete data set (i.e. including
deposits) for the period 1959 ¡ 1999. Recall that this is the period to which the other
parameters of the model were calibrated.15
Once the parameters of the model (¯;±;®;°;Á;µ;h;g;´;R) are calibrated and once
the parameters of the stochastic processes governing log(z) and log(x) (½0,½1,¾",'0,'1,¾À,¾"À)
are estimated, the recursive competitive equilibrium is solved with the linear-quadratic
method [see Cooley and Hansen (1995) or Ljunqvist and Sargent (2000), chapter 4].
See the solution and graph appendix for a check on the accuracy and robustness of the
14An alternative calibration strategy is to target the observed b=y instead of the observed d=y.
Following such strategy requires the use of loan interest rate data while targeting the deposit to
output ratio requires the use of deposit interest rate data. Given the heterogeneity implicit in the
di®erent loan interest rate series available, the choice of a representative or average loan interest rate
is a di±cult choice that can be avoided by choosing to target d=y instead of b=y.
15The estimates do not change signi¯cantly when deposits are removed from the data set to construct
z and x (see shock identi¯cation appendix).
28Table 6:
b ½0 b ½1 b ¾" c '0 c '1 c ¾À
0:0153 0:9981 0:0069 ¡0:0262 0:9728 0:0160
solution method.
4 EXPERIMENT
The experiment consists of setting the economy at its non-stochastic, stationary state
and then hitting it with a positive, one standard deviation shock to " and to À. Each
shock is done separately both under the ¯nancially frictionless environment and under
the credit constrained environment.
The solution and graph appendix illustrates the response of (y; c; i; q; d; b; n1;
n2; w; r; s; ½) to each shock. The thin line of each graph traces the response to the
À shock while the thick line traces the response to the " shock. Graphs 1-12 refer to
the case when there is no credit constraint while graphs 13-24 refer to the binding
credit constraint scenario. First of all note that the propagation and ampli¯cation
mechanisms of the credit constraint are not strong enough to alter in a signi¯cant way
the qualitative response of the economy.16
The following tables display, for several time windows, the cumulated response of
per capita output, consumption, investment and credit to each of the shocks in terms
16The only variable whose response is di®erent under a binding credit constraint is the rental rate of
land. Note that when there is no constraint the response of s to the ¾" shock displays a hump. With
a binding credit constraint the hump disappears. The reason is that with a binding credit constraint
the rental rate of land depends not only on the marginal productivity of land but also on q [recall
equation (10)]. Hence, with a binding credit constraint the behavior of q dampens the hump-shaped
response of s under the ¯nancially frictionless environment.
29Table 7: " shock
j #, a ¡! y c i b ycc ccc icc bcc
1 year 4:24 1:36 2:60 0:21 3:88 1:29 2:53 0:05
2 years 8:62 3:01 5:03 0:42 7:96 2:89 4:91 0:13
5 years 22:22 9:20 11:55 1:08 20:98 8:93 11:34 0:54
10 years 45:49 21:62 20:86 2:20 43:48 21:21 20:63 1:49
20 years 90:94 47:98 36:94 4:36 89:30 47:56 36:77 3:65
Table 8: À shock
j #, a ¡! y c i b ycc ccc icc bcc
1 year 0:81 0:17 0:58 0:36 0:80 0:18 0:61 0:33
2 years 1:57 0:40 1:07 0:69 1:58 0:42 1:13 0:64
5 years 3:54 1:21 2:10 1:48 3:67 1:29 2:24 1:42
10 years 5:92 2:53 2:99 2:34 6:29 2:75 3:23 2:31
20 years 8:30 4:16 3:58 3:13 9:04 4:57 3:89 3:18






¤ 100 for a = y;c;i;b; i = ";À
Columns two through ¯ve (y;c;i;b) refer to the results from the model with no
credit constraint while columns six through nine (ycc;ccc;icc;bcc) portray the results
from the model with a binding credit constraint.
Note from table 1 that in the case of the non-banking TFP shock (") the e®ects
under the credit constrained environment are quantitatively lower than under the ¯-
30nancially frictionless environment! Table 2 shows that in the case of the banking TFP
shock (À) the opposite is true. But with either shock the quantitative di®erence between
the e®ects under ¯nancially constrained and unconstrained scenarios is very small (as a
percentage of stationary output). This is in spite of the static and dynamic credit mul-
tipliers of the credit constrained economy which are supposed to amplify and propagate
the shocks.
How robust are these results to alternative banking technologies? For instance, it
has been argued that bank employees posses valuable information about the bank's
clients. In other words, certain information capital is embedded in bank employees. If
so, releasing employees is costly due to the information capital lost by the bank. Hiring
new employees is also costly due to the information capital that must be accumulated
before these new employees become fully productive. According to this view, a bank
faces adjustment costs in employment. Alternatively, it might be that the elasticity of
substitution between deposits and labor in the intermediation technology is very low.
Suppose all this is true. A negative banking shock should certainly induce a higher
response of the loan rate than with the Cobb-Douglas banking technology suggested
here. In consequence, there might be more action coming from the ¯nancial friction.
Indeed, the ¯nancial acceleration mechanism might exhibit quantitatively signi¯cant
e®ects.
To address this issue the model was recalibrated with a Leontief production func-
tion in the bank and the same experiment as above was carried out. Under the un-
constrained environment the qualitative and quantitative results do not change signif-
icantly. The only signi¯cant di®erence is that the response of credit to the banking
shock falls considerably. This is a natural result because with zero elasticity of substi-
tution between deposits and labor all the adjustment must come from the loan rate.
However, the model's implications for the stationary value of the loan rate are at absurd
variance with the data. Under a credit constrained environment (with or without ad-
31justment costs in employment) the qualitative and quantitative results of the Leontief
experiment might change signi¯cantly but, again, the implications for the stationary
value of the loan rate are at great variance with the data.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The KM framework features credit constraints as the essential factor that propagates
and ampli¯es the e®ects of macroeconomic shocks. However, the quantitative signi¯-
cance of the macroeconomic e®ects coming from the credit constraint in the KM setup
is an open question. As I have shown in this paper, under a plausible calibration of the
KM framework the quantitative signi¯cance of the macroeconomic e®ects coming from
the credit constraint in the KM setup is very low.
Theoretically, Kocherlakota (2000) showed that such a result for the KM setup was
possible. Empirically, the result should come as no surprise either given the long-run
behavior of loans relative to GNP or relative to the capital stock in the U.S. (see
¯gure 1) The graph on the top traces the evolution of the change in the U.S. stock of
commercial and industrial loans as a fraction of GNP. The graph on the bottom traces
the evolution of the ratio between the U.S. stock of commercial and industrial loans
and the stock of private total capital and private non-residential capital.
Note that the weight of commercial and industrial loans in GNP or in the capital
stock has been low. Hence, any plausible calibration of the KM framework replicating
such low weight will not produce signi¯cant responses in investment value attributable
to a credit constraint. Simply put, loans are not quantitatively that important in U.S.
economic activity so as to generate plausibly calibrated parameter values that induce
quantitatively signi¯cant propagation/ampli¯cation e®ects imputable to the credit con-
straint in the KM setup. In fact, according to my calibration strategy (see above), only
0.54% of assets in the U.S. economy are employed as collateral for commercial and in-
32dustrial loans.
Undoubtedly, to ¯nd the missing credit constraint action in U.S. macro data we
need a more stylized macroeconomic model. Needless to say, it must be one that does at
least as well as the standard RBC model in replicating basic empirical regularities. On
the other hand, it might be the case that the missing credit multiplier action is buried
in ¯rm level data that vanishes in the aggregate over all sectors of the economy. If
so, what is the macroeconomic relevance of these ¯nancial accelerator/credit multiplier
models? Are they plausible theoretical structures for macro policy recommendations?
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387 TECHNICAL APPENDIX
This appendix displays the proofs to the propositions in the paper.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The following proof applies to proposition 1.
Proof. Note that if the ¯rm defaults on the bank loan, the bank may not have su±cient
resources to pay the labor it employs. If so, the bank will totally or partially default on
payments to labor services provided by the household and the labor supply decision will
be a®ected by the decision to default or not default. This does not happen if the bank's
labor costs do not exceed the value of the seized assets: w(n2h) 6 (1¡»)[ql+(1¡±)k].
Let the latter condition be called the bank's full wage payment condition (fwp). From
(P3) in de¯nition 4 optimal labor demand by the bank implies w(n2h) = (1¡µ)(1+½)b.
With this result (fwp) becomes:
b 6
(1 ¡ »)[ql + (1 ¡ ±)k]
(1 ¡ µ)(1 + ½)
(fwp)
Conjecture: (fwp) holds.
Suppose that at the beginning of any given period the bank extends a loan b to the
¯rm to be repaid at the end of the period. The household has rented all of its capital
stock and all of its land to the ¯rm. After observing the shocks the household has
also supplied an amount of labor that is not a®ected by the possibility of default on
the bank. Hence, with or without default the output of the ¯rm and the bank are the
same.
Suppose the ¯rm's owner (i.e. household) defaults on the bank loan in any given
period. Under this scenario the household only gets to keep »[ql+(1¡±)k] of its total
assets but appropriates 100% of the ¯rm's output and is paid (1 ¡ µ) of the bank's
39output. The household's instantaneous payo® under a default-strategy (¼D) is:
¼
D = (1 ¡ µ)(1 + ½)b + y + »[ql + (1 ¡ ±)k]
Now suppose that the ¯rm's owner or household does not default on the bank loan.
If so, the household gets to keep 100% of its assets and is paid (1 ¡ µ) of the bank's
output but does not appropriate the full share of the ¯rm's output. Under a no-default
strategy the instantaneous payo® (¼ND) to the household is:
¼
ND = (1 ¡ µ)(1 + ½)b + y ¡ (1 + ½)b + ql + (1 ¡ ±)k
Given that default is not penalized with market exclusion, a ¯rm will not default on a
loan only if ¼D 6 ¼ND. This implies:
(1 ¡ µ)(1 + ½)b + y + »[ql + (1 ¡ ±)x] 6 y ¡ µ(1 + ½)b + ql + (1 ¡ ±)k
or:
b 6
(1 ¡ »)[ql + (1 ¡ ±)k]
(1 + ½)
and the conjecture holds. Given that in equilibrium ld = l, kd = k and bd = b, the
previous condition can also be rewritten as:
b
d 6
(1 ¡ »)[qld + (1 ¡ ±)kd]
(1 + ½)
Q.E.D.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 6
The following proof applies to proposition 6.
Proof. The Euler equation that governs the consumption-land accumulation decision

















[(1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)yt+1 + qt+1]
¸
Let:
¢t = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)yt























Using (TA1) to substitute for qt+1 in (TA1) implies:
























Using the law of iterated expectations (TA2) becomes:



















Using (TA1) to substitute for qt+2 in (TA3) implies:






























Using the law of iterated expectations (TA4) becomes:













































¢t = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)yt
Q.E.D.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 7
The following proof applies to proposition 7.
Proof. The Euler equation that governs the consumption-land accumulation decision




































¡ (1 ¡ »)
¶
qt+1 + qt+1]g


















¢t = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)yt
and:



























Using (TA1cc) to substitute for qt+1 in (TA1cc) implies:

























43Using the law of iterated expectations (TA2cc) becomes:





















Using (TA1cc) to substitute for qt+2 in (TA3cc) implies:

































Using the law of iterated expectations (TA4cc) becomes:






















































¢t = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ° ¡ Á)yt
and:





The next corollary establishes a su±cient condition to rule out the bubble compo-
nent of the price of land.





< (1 + ½t) 8t then the no-bubble condition holds.
Proof. A su±cient condition for (TA6cc) to hold is:



















¡ (1 + ½t)
¸¾
< (1 + ½t) 8t (TA7cc)
Now, recall that ¸t is the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) multiplier associated to the borrowing




¡ (1 + ½t) > 0 (7cc)
The KT theorem establishes that ¸t > 0 8t. From the de¯nition of ¸t in equa-
tion (7cc) it can be seen that the KT theorem also implies that (Áyt=bt) ¡ (1 +
½t) > 0 8t. Hence, e ¯»[(Áyt=bt) ¡ (1 + ½t)] > 0 8t. This last result implies that
e ¯ f(Áyt=bt) ¡ »[(Áyt=bt) ¡ (1 + ½t)]g 6 e ¯ (Áyt=bt) 8t. Thus, a su±cient yet stronger




< (1 + ½t) 8t
Q.E.D.
458 CALIBRATION APPENDIX
Parameter values were chosen so that the model, in stationary state, mimics some
long-run empirical regularities observed in the U.S. Speci¯cally, the parameters were
calibrated to a quarterly frequency using U.S. data for the period 1959-1999.
8.1 No Credit Constraint
From (1)-(10) it can be shown that the following system of equations characterizes the
























































= 1 ¡ (´ + g + ´g + ±)
k
y




n = n1 + n2 (11ss)
46From (10ss):
± =
1 ¡ (´ + g + g´)k
y ¡ c




























From (7ss) and (8ss):
µÁ = deposit share
From (4ss), (7ss), (9ss) and (11ss):
labor share = ° + (1 ¡ µ)Á = ° + Á ¡ µÁ
Hence:
labor share = ° + Á ¡ deposit share
Rearranging:
Á = labor share + deposit share ¡ ° (5cal)
47From (7ss), (8ss) and (5cal):
µ =
deposit share
labor share + deposit share ¡ °
(6cal)
From (5ss):
® = capital share (7cal)

















Suppose that the credit constraint binds. Hence, from (1)-(6) and (7cc)-(10cc) it
can be shown that the following system of equations characterizes the steady state


















































































= 1 ¡ (± + ´ + g + g´)
k
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1 ¡ (´ + g + g´)k
y ¡ c




















































































¡ = (1 ¡ »)
"Ã
e ¯
1 ¡ e ¯
!








= (1 ¡ »)
"Ã
e ¯
1 ¡ e ¯
!
















At this point the only parameters pending for calibration are Á and ®. The only
two equations that have not been used are (5cc
ss) and (6cc
ss). Apparently, both of them




























capital share + land share + ° + ¡ = 1
The latter equation holds by construction given that ¡ is credit share and that there
are constant returns to scale. Thus, (5cc
ss) and (6cc
ss) are an underidenti¯ed system to
pin down Á and ® in terms of observables. Consequently, one of the two parameters is
51free. The calibration strategy is to pick Á > ¡ = (deposit share)=µ (so that the credit
constraint binds)17 and then obtain ® from (5cc
ss) and (8cc
ss) in the following way:












ss) must hold by construction.
















and Á is chosen freely.
Note that (1cc
cal)-(4cc
cal) are identical to (1cal)-(4cal) and that (5cc
cal) is identical to
(6cal). Hence, regardless of whether the credit constraint binds or not, the calibration
for ±, ¯, h, ° and µ is always the same. However, the equations that calibrate ® and
Á change when the credit constraint binds [i.e. Á > ¡ = (deposit share)=µ and (7cc
cal)
di®er from (5cal) and (7cal)]. Note, however, that both sets of equations are identical if
Á = ¡ = (deposit share)=µ, which means that the credit constraint does not bind.18
8.3 Data to Measure £ and £0
To construct the empirical counterparts of £ and £0 the following U.S. data was used:
17Recall that the credit constraint binds if ¸ =
Áy




18Recall that the credit constraint does not bind if ¸ =
Áy




52² pop: Total population, all ages (including armed forces overseas). Source: U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau. Original frequency: Monthly. Units: Thou-
sands. Sample: 1952.01-2000.11.
² n: Civilian labor force (16 yrs. and older) that is employed (seasonally adjusted).
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Original frequency: Monthly. Units: Percent.
Sample: 1948.01-2002.01.
² n2: Commercial Bank employees (all employees) as a fraction of civilian labor
force (16 yrs. and older) (seasonally adjusted). Source: Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. Original frequency: Monthly. Units: Percent. Sample: 1972.01-2001.12.
² rT(1): 3 month certi¯cate of deposit (cod) interest rate. Source: H.15 Release.
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Original frequency: Monthly (average of
business days). Units: Percent. Sample: 1964.06-2001.12.
² rT(2): National monthly median cost of funds ratio to SAIF-insured institutions.
It is de¯ned as interest (dividends) paid or accrued on deposits, on FHLB ad-
vances and on other borrowed money during a month as a percent of balances of
deposits at month end. It re°ects rates on all funds, not just new funds. This
ratio is annualized by multiplying by 12 and adjusted for variation in length of
month. Source: OTS. Original frequency: Monthly. Units: Percent. Sample:
1979.05-2001.11.
² bCI: Commercial and industrial loans at all commercial banks (seasonally ad-
justed stocks). Source: H.8 Release. Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Orig-
inal frequency: Monthly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.01-2001.12.
² bTOT: Total loans and investments at all commercial banks (seasonally adjusted
stocks). Source: H.8 Release. Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Original
frequency: Monthly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.01-2001.12.
53² dTOT: Total checkable deposits plus total time deposits at commercial banks
(seasonally adjusted stocks). Source: H.6 Release. Federal Reserve Board of
Governors. Original frequency: Monthly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample:
1959.01-2001.12.
² dT: Total time deposits at commercial banks (seasonally adjusted stocks). Source:
H.6 Release. Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Original frequency: Monthly.
Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1959.01-2001.12.
² kP: Current cost, net stock of private total ¯xed assets (equipment and software
plus structures plus residential assets, including owner-occupied housing) located
in the US that are owned by private business or nonpro¯t institutions. Current
cost valuation measures the value of these assets in the prices of the given period,
which are end of year for net stocks and annual averages for depreciation. Source:
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency:
Annual. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1925-2000.
² kG: Current cost, net stock of government's total ¯xed assets (equipment and
software plus structures plus residential assets). Current cost valuation measures
the value of these assets in the prices of the given period, which are end of
year for net stocks and annual averages for depreciation. Source: U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency: Annual. Units:
Billions of dollars. Sample: 1925-2000.
² kD: Current cost, net stock of consumer durable goods. Current cost valuation
measures the value of these assets in the prices of the given period, which are end
of year for net stocks and annual averages for depreciation. Source: U.S. Dept.
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency: Annual. Units:
Billions of dollars. Sample: 1925-2000.
54² cND: Personal consumption expenditures in non-durable goods (seasonally ad-
justed annual rates). Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Original frequency: Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample:
1947.I-2001.IV.
² cS: Personal consumption expenditures in services (seasonally adjusted annual
rates). Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original
frequency: Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.IV.
² cG: Government consumption expenditures (seasonally adjusted annual rates).
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original fre-
quency: Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.IV.
² iP: Gross private domestic investment (seasonally adjusted annual rates). Source:
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency:
Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.IV.
² iG: Government gross investment expenditures (seasonally adjusted annual rates).
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original fre-
quency: Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.IV.
² iD: Personal consumption expenditures in durable goods (seasonally adjusted
annual rates). Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis. Original frequency: Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-
2001.IV.
² NX: Net exports (seasonally adjusted annual rates). Source: U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency: Quarterly. Units:
Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.IV.
² GNP: Gross National Product (seasonally adjusted annual rates). Source: U.S.
55Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency: Quar-
terly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.III.
² Corporate pro¯ts: Corporate pro¯ts with capital consumption adjustment and
inventory valuation adjustment (seasonally adjusted annual rates). Source: U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency: Quar-
terly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.III.
² Net interest: Net interest (seasonally adjusted annual rates). Source: U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency: Quar-
terly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.III.
² Proprietor0s income: Proprietor's income with capital consumption adjust-
ment and inventory valuation adjustment (seasonally adjusted annual rates).
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original fre-
quency: Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.IV.
² NNP: Net national product (seasonally adjusted annual rates). Source: U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency: Quar-
terly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.III.
² National income: National income (seasonally adjusted annual rates). Source:
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency:
Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.III.
² Depreciation: Consumption of ¯xed capital (seasonally adjusted annual rates).
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original fre-
quency: Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars. Sample: 1947.I-2001.IV.
² Rental income: Rental income of persons with capital consumption adjustment
(seasonally adjusted annual rates). Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
56Economic Analysis. Original frequency: Quarterly. Units: Billions of dollars.
Sample: 1947.I-2001.IV.
Monthly frequencies are averaged out to quarterly frequencies. Quarterly frequen-
cies are averaged out to annual frequencies. All nominal variables (including nominal
interest rates) are transformed into real terms (billions of 1996 dollars) with the implicit
chain-type GNP price de°ator:
² Price index: GNP chain-type price index (seasonally adjusted). Source: U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Original frequency: Quar-
terly. Units: 1996=100. Sample: 1947.I-2001.III.
Some empirical issues regarding the \correct" empirical counterparts of (R; d; k; c;
i; y) must be discussed. First of all, note that interest rate data on cod's [rT(1)] or the
data on the cost of funds ratio of thrift institutions [rT(2)] overestimate the average
interest rate paid by commercial banks. The reason is that commercial banks not
only compete for time deposits but also provide checkable deposits paying an interest
rate lower than rT (zero during many years due to regulation Q). Thus, rT has to be
adjusted to obtain a more accurate measure of the cost of funds ratio of commercial




where rCH represents the interest rate on checkable deposits and dCH stands for











in order to obtain a more accurate mea-
surement of the cost of funds ratio of commercial banks.
57The second important empirical issue is that not all deposits in commercial banks
are used to ¯nance commercial and industrial loans. Some of them are used to ¯nance
consumption loans, real estate loans, loans to the government, etc. Therefore, the
data on total stock of deposits at commercial banks (dTOT) must be adjusted so
that the relevant stock of deposits used by commercial banks to ¯nance commercial
and industrial loans is captured. As a simple rule of thumb, the adjustment factor
employed is the ratio of commercial and industrial loans at commercial banks to total






Note that this adjustment factor underestimates the amount of resources used by
commercial banks to ¯nance commercial and industrial loans. Indeed, net worth or
liabilities and purchased funds di®erent than deposits may also be used to ¯nance
commercial and industrial loans.
The third empirical issue that has to be discussed is the measurement of (k;c;i;y).
As is standard in the RBC literature, (k;c;i) are measured with:
k = kP + kG + kD
c = cND + cS + cG
i = iP + iG + iD + NX
However, the \correct" empirical counterpart of y is not GNP because the latter
only includes income imputable to land, labor and the private stock of capital (kP).
It does not include income imputable to the government's stock of capital (kG) or to
the stock of consumer durables (kD) which are part of the empirical counterpart of k.
58GNP does not include income imputable to deposits either and in the model deposits
operate as an input of production in addition to land, labor, and capital. Consequently,
the proper empirical counterpart of y is GNP adjusted to include income imputable
to kG, kD and d. To compute income imputable to kG and kD the methodology of
Cooley and Prescott (1995) is followed. Let yP represent income imputable to kP and
®P represent kP's share of total income. Thus:
yP = ®PGNP = Corporate pro¯ts + Net interest+
®P (Proprietor0s income + NNP ¡ National income) +
Depreciation
Solving for ®P yields the following result:
®P =
Corporate pro¯ts + Net interest + Depreciation
GNP ¡ (Proprietor0s income + NNP ¡ National income)
Given that there is data on all the elements of the right hand side of the previous
equation, a series for ®P can be constructed. Now let r stand for the rate of return on
any type of capital (i.e. kP, kG or kD) and ±P represent the depreciation rate of kP.
Hence, by de¯nition:
yP = ®PGNP = (r + ±P)kP (*)
This is:
yP = ®PGNP = rkP + Depreciation




59Given that there is data on all the elements of the right hand side of the previous
equation, a series for r can be constructed. Now consider the law of motion of kG:
k
0
G = (1 ¡ ±G)kG + iG
where ±G represents the rate of depreciation of kG. It is possible to solve for ±G:







Given that there is data on all the elements of the right hand side of the previous
equation, a series for ±G can be constructed. Similarly, a series for ±D, the rate of
depreciation of kD, can be constructed:







Now let yG and yD represent income imputable to kG and kD. By de¯nition:
yG = (r + ±G)kG (**)
yD = (r + ±D)kD (***)
Given that there is data on all the elements of the right hand side of the two previous
equations, series for yG and yD can be constructed. Finally, the \correct" empirical
counterpart of y is constructed according to the following formula:
y = GNP + yG + yD + (1 + R)d
Speci¯cally:















60The average (as opposed to each observation) of [rT(2) ¤ (dT=dTOT)] is used to
construct y because data for such series is only available since 1964. If each observation
of [rT(2) ¤ (dT=dTOT)] is used to construct y then all the information of the other
variables (i.e. GNP, yG and yD) prior to 1964 would be lost.
The measurement of the di®erent elements of £ and £0 (which determine ª and































































where yp, yG, yD and y are de¯ned and constructed according to (*), (**), (***)
and (****).
Note that the model was calibrated with data for period 1959-1999. Even though
the NIPA data goes until 2001, data for the capital stock only goes until 2000. More-
over, the last observation (2000) is lost in the calibration process due to the way ±G
61and ±D are constructed. On the other hand, even though the NIPA data starts earlier
than 1959, data for deposits only starts in this year. The only two series which do
not coincide with the calibration time period are that of the interest rate and that of
employment in commercial banks which start in 1964 and 1972, respectively.









n2° = n1(1 ¡ µ)Á
Given that n2 = n ¡ n1 this equation implies:
(n ¡ n1)° = n1(1 ¡ µ)Á
or, rearranging:
°n = [° + (1 ¡ µ)Á]n1
This, in turn, implies:




[° + (1 ¡ µ)Á]























° ((1 ¡ ­)nh)
(1¡µ)Á
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From (2sid) ¯nal good total output is given by:



























where N stands for the total number of workers, H represents total work hours
supplied by households and k and L the total stock of capital and land. Let e be (zxÁ)
or the composite shock, representing TFP at the aggregate level. Given that A1 is a
constant and that K and L are pretty stable across time, equation (3sid) shows that e




or, if D is also su±ciently stable across time, then there is no need for data on




The latter way of measuring e is the standard way of measuring aggregate TFP.




64Using (1sid) this is:
b = xd
µ [(1 ¡ ­)nh]
1¡µ





A2 = (1 ¡ ­)
1¡µ
From (5sid) total banking output is given by:






where H represents total work hours supplied by households. Given that A2 is a




or, if D is su±ciently stable across time, then there is no need for data on deposits
















65U.S. quarterly data and equations (4sid), (7sid) and (8sid) [or, alternatively, equa-
tions (4sid'), (7sid') and (8sid) if no deposit data is to be employed] were used to
construct e, x and z, respectively. Note that the construction of z is not sensitive to
deposit data.
The values of Á, µ and ° used for the construction of e, x and z were those resulting
from the calibration of the model under no credit constraints (the calibrated values
of µ and ° do not depend on whether there is a constraint or not but the value of
Á does). Note also that the construction of e; x and z uses optimality conditions
for the unconstrained environment. In fact, if there is a binding credit constraint
°
y
n1 = (1 ¡ µ)Á
y
n2 does not hold. Instead: °
y
n1 < (1 ¡ µ)Á
y
n2. This does not allow
equation (1sid) to hold. However, an expression similar to (1sid) can be found where
­ is not a constant but equal to °y=[(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ »)(ql + (1 ¡ ±)k) + °y]. If K, q and
L are stable across time, the construction of e; x and z under no credit constraints
should also apply for the binding credit constraint case.
The following list describes the data used to construct e; x and z:
² Y : Real GNP (seasonally adjusted annual rates). Source: U.S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Frequency: Quarterly. Units: Billions of
chained 1996 dollars. Sample: 1959.I-1999.IV if (4sid) is used to construct e and
z; 1947.I-1999.IV if (4sid') is used to construct e and z.
² H: Total annual hours in the private non-farm sector (seasonally adjusted).
Source: Establishment survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Frequency: Quarterly.
Sample: Units: Billions of hours. Sample: 1959.I-1999.IV if (4sid) and (7sid) are
used to construct e, x and z; 1947.I-1999.IV if (4sid') and (7sid') are used to
construct e, x and z.
² D: Total checkable deposits plus total time deposits at commercial banks, de-
°ated by the GNP chain-type price index (seasonally adjusted stocks). Source:
66H.6 Release. Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Frequency: Quarterly aver-
ages of monthly values. Units: Billions of chained 1996 dollars. Sample: 1959.I-
1999.IV. Note: This series was not adjusted by the ratio of commercial and in-
dustrial loans at commercial banks to total loans and investments at commercial
banks (as in the calibration process). Recall that this adjustment was necessary
to account for the fact that not all deposits in commercial banks are used to
¯nance commercial and industrial loans (which is the empirical counterpart of
credit -see below-). However, adjusting deposits in the same way to construct a
series for x and then estimate log(xt+1) = '0 + '1 log(xt) + Àt+1 introduces ad-
ditional noise coming from the °uctuations in the portfolio of commercial banks.
Hence, not adjusting deposits for the construction of x is more appropriate as
long as the total stock of deposits at commercial banks moves closely with that
fraction of them that is used to ¯nance commercial and industrial loans.
² B: Commercial and industrial loans at all commercial banks, de°ated by the
GNP chain-type price index (seasonally adjusted stocks). Source: H.8 Release.
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Frequency: Quarterly averages of monthly
values. Units: Billions of chained 1996 dollars. Sample: 1959.I-1999.IV if (4sid)
and (7sid) are used to construct e, x and z; 1947.I-1999.IV if (4sid') and (7sid')
are used to construct e, x and z.
Next, the stochastic processes governing log(e), log(x) and log(z) were estimated:
log(zt+1) = ½0 + ½1 log(zt) + "t+1; "t v N(0;¾
2
")
log(xt+1) = '0 + '1 log(xt) + Àt+1; Àt v N(0;¾
2
À)
log(et+1) = ¼0 + ¼1 log(et) + ²t+1; ²t v N(0;¾
2)
67The estimates of the parameters in the AR(1) processes governing log(e), log(x) and
log(z) depend on whether data for deposits is used or not [i.e. on whether equations
(4sid), (7sid) and (8sid) or (4sid'), (7sid') and (8sid) are used to construct e, x and z].
The resulting estimates are:
b ½0 b ½1 b ¾"
With deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 0:0153 0:9981 0:0069
Without deposit data (1947.I-1999.IV) 0:0158 0:9980 0:0073
c '0 c '1 c ¾À
With deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) ¡0:0262 0:9728 0:0160
Without deposit data (1947.I-1999.IV) 0:0475 0:9934 0:0191
b ¼0 b ¼1 b ¾
With deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 0:0193 0:9973 0:0067






With deposit data (1959.I-1999.IV) 4:7 ¤ 10¡5 2:3262 2:3998
Without deposit data (1947.I-1999.IV) 5:3 ¤ 10¡5 2:6120 2:6123
6810 SOLUTION AND GRAPH APPENDIX
Once the parameters of the model (¯; ±; ®; °; Á; µ; h; g; ´; R) are calibrated and
once the parameters of the stochastic processes governing log(z) and log(x) (½0; ½1;
¾"; '0; '1; ¾À; ¾"À) are estimated, the recursive competitive equilibrium is solved with
the linear-quadratic method [see Cooley and Hansen (1995) or Ljunqvist and Sargent
(2000), chapter 4].
The following tables provide a check on the accuracy and robustness of the solu-
tion method. The ¯rst line presents the values of the model's main macroeconomic
aggregates under its non-stochastic, stationary version (SS) which, recall, replicates
U.S. data averages for the period 1959 ¡ 1999 (independently of whether there is a
binding credit constraint or no constraint at all). Lines two and three show, for the
same aggregates, their non-stochastic, stationary values as inferred from the optimal,
linear decision rules under the no-constraint and binding credit constraint scenarios
(RuleSS and RuleSScc, respectively). The last two lines present, for the no-constraint
and binding credit constraint scenarios (Sim and Simcc, respectively), the aggregates'
means across 100 simulations of the economy of 264 periods (i.e. quarters) each. In
each simulation the initial state is set at its non-stochastic, stationary value. The ¯rst
100 periods of each simulation are discarded so that each simulation represents 41 years
(i.e. 1959-1999).
c=y i=y d=y k=y n n1 n2
SS 0:5914 0:3422 0:0661 10:1740 0:9399 0:9299 0:0100
RuleSS 0:5914 0:3422 0:0661 10:1740 0:9399 0:9299 0:0100
RuleSScc 0:5918 0:3420 0:0659 10:1662 0:9402 0:9292 0:0110
Sim 0:5935 0:3404 0:0658 10:1174 0:9401 0:9301 0:0100
Simcc 0:5938 0:3404 0:0655 10:1038 0:9406 0:9296 0:0110
69labor share land share capital share deposit share
SS 0:5394 0:0130 0:3811 0:0664
RuleSS 0:5394 0:0130 0:3811 0:0664
RuleSScc 0:5400 0:0131 0:3813 0:0662
Sim 0:5390 0:0130 0:3809 0:0661
Simcc 0:5396 0:0132 0:3814 0:0658
Prices yielded by the model depend on whether there is a binding credit constraint
or no constraint at all [see equations (7)-(10) and (7cc)-(10cc) and propositions 6 and
7]. The following table reports, for the model with no credit constraint, prices under
its non-stochastic, stationary version, prices in stationary state as inferred from the
optimal decision rules, and average prices across the simulations:
w r s q ½
SS 1:8432 0:0375 0:0260 6:8680 0:3916
RuleSS 1:8432 0:0375 0:0260 6:8980 0:3916
Sim 1:8663 0:0377 0:0264 6:9212 0:4025
The following table reports, for the model with a binding credit constraint, prices
under its non-stochastic, stationary version, prices in stationary state as inferred from
the optimal decision rules, and average prices across the simulations:
w r s q ½
SS 1:7289 0:0375 0:0244 6:4421 0:3845
RuleSScc 1:7292 0:0375 0:0245 6:3784 0:3740
Simcc 1:7501 0:0378 0:0250 6:4243 0:3770
It can be seen from the previous tables that the solution method is robust to the
analytical version of the model. Note that under both versions of the model the loan
rate (½) is unrealistically high (40%).
70    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 1:Response of Y
    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 2: Response of C
71    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
    101.40
    101.60
    101.80
    102.00
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 3:Response of I
    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 4: Response of q
72    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 5: Response of D
    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
    101.40
    101.60
    101.80
    102.00
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 6: Response of B
73     99.90
    100.00
    100.10
    100.20
    100.30
    100.40
    100.50
    100.60
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 7: Response of N1
     99.90
    100.00
    100.10
    100.20
    100.30
    100.40
    100.50
    100.60
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 8: Response of N2
74    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 9: Response of w
     99.80
    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 10: Response of r
75    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 11: Response of s
     94.00
     95.00
     96.00
     97.00
     98.00
     99.00
    100.00
    101.00
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 12: Response of rho
76    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 13: Response of Y
    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 14: Response of C
77    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
    101.40
    101.60
    101.80
    102.00
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 15: Response of I
    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 16: Response of q
78    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 17: Response of D
    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
    101.40
    101.60
    101.80
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 18: Response of B
79     99.95
    100.00
    100.05
    100.10
    100.15
    100.20
    100.25
    100.30
    100.35
    100.40
    100.45
    100.50
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 19: Response of N1
     99.95
    100.00
    100.05
    100.10
    100.15
    100.20
    100.25
    100.30
    100.35
    100.40
    100.45
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 20: Response of N2
80    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 21: Response of w
     99.80
    100.00
    100.20
    100.40
    100.60
    100.80
    101.00
    101.20
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 22: Response of r
81    100.00
    100.50
    101.00
    101.50
    102.00
    102.50
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 23: Response of s
     94.00
     95.00
     96.00
     97.00
     98.00
     99.00
    100.00
    101.00
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Graph 24: Response of rho
82